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George T. Amariucai, Member IEEE, and Shuangqing Wei, Member IEEE
Abstract—In this paper we study the problem of half-
duplex active eavesdropping in fast fading channels. The active
eavesdropper is a more powerful adversary than the classical
eavesdropper. It can choose between two functional modes:
eavesdropping the transmission between the legitimate parties
(Ex mode), and jamming it (Jx mode) – the active eavesdropper
cannot function in full duplex mode. We consider a conservative
scenario, when the active eavesdropper can choose its strategy
based on the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair’s strategy –
and thus the transmitter and legitimate receiver have to plan
for the worst. We show that conventional physical-layer secrecy
approaches perform poorly (if at all), and we introduce a novel
encoding scheme, based on very limited and unsecured feedback
– the Block-Markov Wyner (BMW) encoding scheme – which
outperforms any schemes currently available.
Index Terms—Eavesdropper Channel, Secrecy Capacity, Bi-
nary Symmetric Channels, Feedback.
I. INTRODUCTION
A great number of recent works have been fueled by the
still growing interest in physical layer secrecy. Most of them
attempt to overcome the limitations of the classical wiretap-
per/eavesdropper scenarios of [1] or [2] (namely that no secret
message can be successfully transmitted if the eavesdropper’s
channel is less noisy than the legitimate receiver’s channel) by
using some form of diversity.
The benefits of the ergodic-fading diversity upon the achiev-
able secrecy rates have been exposed by works like [3], [4],
[5] or [6]. A fast-fading eavesdropper channel is studied in
[3] under the assumption that the main channel is a fixed-SNR
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel. Although the
secrecy capacity for fast-fading eavesdropper channels is still
unknown, [3] provides achievable secrecy rates and shows that
sometimes noise injection at the transmitter can improve these
rates.
The different approach of [4] models both the main and the
eavesdropper channels as ergodicly-fading AWGN channels.
However, the fading is assumed to be slow enough to be
considered constant for infinitely long blocks of transmitted
symbols. The secrecy capacity is derived for this model, and
the achievability part is proved by using separate channel
encoding for each of the blocks. A similar approach is taken
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in [5] and [6], where the fading broadcast channel with
confidential messages (BCC) is considered equivalent to a
parallel AWGN BCC.
However, the slow fading ergodic channel model is quite
restrictive. Although the model can be artificially created by
a multiplexing/demultiplexing architecture as in [7], it still
requires either coarse quantization or long delays (e.g. under
fine quantization, for a channel state with low probability it
may take a very large number of transmitted symbols to enable
almost-error-free decoding).
With these considerations, we focus instead on a more
practical scenario where both the main and the eavesdropper’s
channel are affected by fast stationary fading. However, unlike
[3], we are concerned with a much stronger adversary: a half-
duplex active eavesdropper.
In our channel model, depicted in Figure 1, the eavesdropper
(Eve) has two options: either to jam the conversation between
the legitimate transmitter (Alice) and the legitimate receiver
(Bob) – Jx mode – or to eavesdrop – Ex mode – (our
eavesdropper cannot function in full duplex mode, i.e. she
cannot transmit and receive on the same frequency slot, at the
same time). Both Alice and Eve (in Jx mode) are constrained
by average (over each codeword) power budgets P and J ,
respectively. Eve’s purpose is to minimize the secrecy rate
achievable by Alice, and to that extent she has to decide
on the optimal alternation between the jamming mode and
the eavesdropping mode. The state of each of the main
and eavesdropper channels, i.e. the absolute squared channel
coefficients (or simply “the channel coefficients” hence forth),
which we denote by hM and hW , respectively, are assumed
to be available to the respective receivers. However, Bob does
not know the exact state of Eve’s channel, nor does Eve have
any information about Bob’s channel, except its statistics.
In addition to fading, each channel is further distorted by
an independent additive white complex Gaussian noise of
variance σ2N . There exists a low-rate, unprotected (i.e. public)
feedback channel between Bob and Alice.
The present paper is limited to the following simplifying
(although not uncommon) assumptions.
i) Rayleigh fading: hM and hW are exponentially dis-
tributed, with parameters λM and λW respectively.
ii) The channel that links Eve (when in Jx mode) and Bob
is error free and does not experience fading [8], [9].
iii) Eve only uses white Gaussian noise for jamming [10],
[8], since this is the most harmful uncorrelated jamming
strategy [11].
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Fig. 1. Channel model
iv) Eve’s exact jamming strategy (i.e. when and with what
power she jams) is perfectly known to Bob (a posteriori) 1
so that Bob can employ coherent detection and communicate
Eve’s strategy to Alice, via the low-rate feedback link.
v) The instantaneous state of the main channel cannot be
known to the transmitter Alice non-causally.
vi) The codewords are long enough such that not only the
channel fading, but also the combination of channel fluctuation
and Eve’s alternation between jamming and eavesdropping
display ergodic properties over the duration of a codeword.
vii) Eve employs an ergodic strategy, i.e. she uses the same
statistics for alternating between Jx mode and Ex mode for
every codeword.
viii) Eve has access to the exact value of hW only after
she made her decision to eavesdrop (Ex mode), and has no
information about the value(s) that hW might take while she
is in Jx mode. This scenario models a situation where the
training sequences, which are transmitted by Alice at a low
rate, and are used by Bob to estimate the channel coefficient
before the transmission of a block of symbols, are protected
against eavesdropping (for instance, by using some form of
secrecy encoding designed for non-coherent reception) or are
simply unknown to Eve. Therefore, Eve cannot use the training
sequences for estimating hW . However, if Eve’s channel is
fading slowly enough, Eve may be able to perform some
form of blind channel estimation. Nevertheless, this kind of
procedure would require Eve to first listen to the incoming
signal for a longer time interval, possibly as long as her
channel coherence time. Under these circumstances, Eve has
to take the decision on whether to jam or eavesdrop in the
absence of any non-causal channel state information (i.e.
randomly).
Our contributions can be stated as follows:
• We introduce the concept of (half-duplex) active eaves-
dropper;
• We show that, under our conservative scenario, Wyner’s
scheme [1] performs poorly (if at all);
1To estimate exactly where Eve jams, one may argue that Bob needs the
coherence time of the channel (which includes Eve’s alternation between jam-
ming and eavesdropping) to span several channel uses. But since the jammer’s
hardware construction will most probably prevent Eve from switching between
Ex and Jx modes instantaneously, the coherence time of the jamming is not
likely to pose any problems. On the other hand, the coherence time of the
channel coefficient hW can be assumed large enough to allow for Bob’s
binary hypothesis testing (Ex or Jx) without bringing up any of the problems
of [4], [5], [6], where the coherence time needs to be large enough to allow
hypothesis testing (decoding) between a number of hypotheses (codewords)
which increases exponentially with the codeword length.
• We provide a novel block-Markov Wyner (BMW) secrecy
encoding scheme, which requires a low-rate, unsecured
feedback link from Bob to Alice, and can improve the
secrecy rate significantly;
• Our BMW scheme employs a diversity of concepts,
such as a-posteriori Wyner-type binning, block-Markov
secrecy encoding and encoding for a compound channel;
• We provide a secrecy-encoding method for multiple-
access channels (MACs), where even if some of the users
are not decodable by the receiver, they can still help with
the transmission of secrecy.
We should note that our BMW scheme displays greater
generality, and is not limited to the present scenario. In fact, we
are currently investigating its use in extending the concepts of
physical-layer secrecy to more realistic slowly-fading-channel
models.
II. THE CONSERVATIVE SCENARIO AND THE ACHIEVABLE
SECRECY RATES
Physical-layer secrecy is synonymous to Wyner-type
secrecy-encoding schemes [1]. The main idea behind these
schemes is to create a special channel code, taylored to
exploit the physical disadvantages of Eve’s channel. Alice
and Bob agree on a certain binning strategy, taylored to
a certain pair of one main and one eavesdropper channels.
Nevertheless, Eve’s actual channel quality remains unknown.
In fact, in most passive-eavesdropper scenarios, Eve herself
remains undetected. Therefore, the Wyner-type schemes are
not influenced by Eve’s position, but by the legitimate parties’
perception about her position.
In our active-eavesdropper scenario, Eve can alternate be-
tween jamming and eavesdropping. However, it is not this
feature that turns out to be devastating for the transmission of
secret messages, as much as the legitimate parties’ uncertainty
about Eve’s strategy. To provide a stable framework for
our investigation, we shall agree on the following notation
and concepts. Throughout this paper, we shall denote q =
Pr{Ex mode} the probability that Eve is in Ex mode over
a given frame. Note that under our assumptions, q uniquely
determines Eve’s strategy over a frame, and remains unknown
to Alice until the end of the frame.
Obviously, Eve’s presence causes a modification of the
channel statistics (as Alice and Bob see them). For example,
whenever Eve is eavesdropping (in Ex mode), the main
channel instantaneous SNR is hMP
σ2
N
, while the SNR of Eve’s
3channel is hWP
σ2
N
– no modification here. However, when Eve
is jamming (in Jx mode), the main channel instantaneous SNR
is hMP
σ2
N
+J
, where J is the instantaneous jamming power subject
to the constraint EJ ≤ J , while the SNR of Eve’s channel is
zero (recall that whenever Eve jams, she cannot simultaneously
listen on the same frequency slot).
From Alice’s and Bob’s perspective, the new equivalent
channel coefficients can be written as
h˜M =
{
hM if Ex mode
hMσ
2
N
σ2
N
+J
if Jx mode (1)
and
h˜W =
{
hW if Ex mode
0 if Jx mode, (2)
with the observation that Alice and Bob still have to agree in
advance on how long Eve should be considered in Ex mode,
and how long she should be considered in Jx mode (i.e. on
the value of q). This kind of information will determine the
encoding strategy and the achievable secrecy rate.
Denote by X the random variable at the input of the two
channels, and by Y and Z the corresponding random variables
received by Bob and Eve, respectively. According to [2], the
secrecy capacity of our model (under the assumption that the
equivalent channel coefficients H˜M and H˜W become perfectly
known to Bob and Eve during transmission, and hence can be
considered as outputs of the channel) is given by
Cs = max
V→X→Y Z
[
I(V ;Y, H˜M )− I(V ;Z, H˜W )
]
≥
≥ max
V→X→Y Z
[
I(V ;Y |H˜M )− I(V ;Z|H˜W )
]
, (3)
where the maximization is over all joint probability distribu-
tions of V and X such that V → X → Y Z form a Markov
chain. The inequality in (3) follows from the independence
between V and HW , and holds with equality if V is also
independent of HM (i.e. Alice has no a-priori channel state
information – CSI). Since the optimal choice of V and
X is presently unknown, we shall henceforth concentrate
on the achievable secrecy rate (instead of secrecy capacity)
obtained by setting V = X and picking a complex Gaussian
distribution for X , with zero mean and variance P . Under
these constraints, the achievable secrecy rate (over a frame)
becomes:
Rs = Eh˜M ,P
[
log(1 +
h˜MP
σ2N
)
]
−
−E
h˜W ,P
[
log(1 +
h˜WP
σ2N
)
]
, (4)
where P is the instantaneous transmitter power and is subject
to the constraint EP ≤ P .
As we have mentioned earlier, a classical Wyner-type
secrecy-encoding scheme uses a codebook designed before-
hand, and taylored to the specific channel conditions (assumed
known in advance). If a codebook were designed for a specific
parameter q = q0, it would fail if Eve decided to use any
different strategy. More precisely, if Eve used q1 > q0, the
perfect secrecy of the message would be compromised (we
call this secrecy outage), while if Eve used q2 < q0, the
secret message would become unintelligible to Bob (we call
this intelligibility outage).
As a result, the legitimate parties have to use a transmission
strategy that can protect both the secrecy and the intelligibility
of the secret message, under any strategy that Eve might use.
This problem is best modeled by the conservative scenario
that makes the assumption that Eve knows Alice’s strategy in
advance. Results for the best-case scenario (or the minimax
scenario), where Alice and Bob know Eve’s strategy in
advance, are given in [12]. Although those results have less
practical value, they can function as an upper-bound for the
achievable secrecy rate, and will be used for comparison in
the numerical results section.
The simplest encoding scheme that offers secrecy protection
in our conservative scenario is one of Wyner type, with a
forwarding rate low enough to protect the message against
the most powerful attempt to induce intelligibility outage (i.e.
when Eve is in Jx mode all the time), and with a secrecy
rate low enough to offer protection against the most powerful
attempt to induce secrecy outage (i.e. when Eve is in Ex mode
all the time). The achievable secrecy rate for this kind of
scheme is
Rs,wcs =
[
EhM ,P,J
[
log(1 +
hMP
σ2N + J
)
]
−
−EhW ,P
[
log(1 +
hWP
σ2N
)
]]+
(5)
(the subscript “wcs” stands for “worst-case scenario”), and
is achieved under the equivalent channel coefficients h˜M =
hM
σ2N
σ2
N
+J
and h˜W = hW . The following two propositions
show that randomizing the instantaneous power is not a geed
idea for either Alice (P ) or Eve (J).
Proposition 1: When no channel state information is avail-
able to the transmitter, the optimal transmitter strategy is to
allocate constant power P = P to each symbol.
Proof: Recall our assumption that both hM and hW
are exponentially distributed, with parameters λM and λW ,
respectively. This means that h˜M is also exponentially dis-
tributed, with parameter λM (1 + Jσ2
N
). Denote the probability
distribution of h˜M by fM (x) = λMe−λMx, and of h˜W = hW
by fW (x) = λW e−λWx.
If λM (1 + Jσ2
N
) ≥ λW (Eve’s equivalent channel is statisti-
cally “better”), then the achievable secrecy rate is zero. In this
case the way Alice distributes her power (without knowledge
of the exact channel coefficients) is irrelevant, and a constant
power allocation is as good as any. Hence we shall concentrate
on the case when λM (1 + Jσ2
N
) < λW .
We need to prove that for this case, the function
Rs,wcs(P ) = EhM ,J log(1 +
h˜MP
σ2N
)−
−EhW log(1 +
hWP
σ2N
) (6)
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is a concave
⋂
function of P . We can write
Rs,wcs(P ) =
∫ ∞
0
log(1 +
xP
σ2N
)(fM (x) − fW (x))dx. (7)
Note that fM (x) − fW (x) is negative for x ∈ [0, x0) and
positive for x ∈ [x0,∞), where x0 is the (unique) solution of
fM (x) = fW (x). Moreover,
∫∞
0 fM (x)dx =
∫∞
0 fW (x)dx =
1, which results in∫ x0
0
[fW (x) − fM (x)]dx =
∫ ∞
x0
[fM (x) − fW (x)]dx. (8)
A graphical representation of these functions is given in Figure
2, where we used the notation f1 = fM and f2 = fW . Take
an increasing function G(x). We can write∫ x0
0
G(x)[fW (x) − fM (x)]dx ≤
≤
∫ x0
0
G(x0)[fW (x) − fM (x)]dx =
=
∫ ∞
x0
G(x0)[fM (x) − fW (x)]dx ≤
≤
∫ ∞
x0
G(x)[fM (x)− fW (x)]dx. (9)
Now, taking G(x) = log(1 + xP
σ2
N
) we see that Rs,wcs(P )
is a positive function of P ; taking G(x) = dF (P )
dP
= x
σ2
N
+xP
we see Rs,wcs(P ) is increasing; and taking G(x) = d
2F (P )
dP 2
=
−
(
x
σ2
N
+xP
)2
we see that Rs,wcs(P ) is concave.
Proposition 2: When in jamming (Jx) mode, Eve’s optimal
strategy is to use the same jamming power J = J1−q across
all channel realizations involved.
Proof: The result follows directly from (5), where only
the first term depends on J , and that term is a convex function
of J .
As a result, the achievable worst-case-scenario secrecy rate
is now simply
Rs,wcs =
[
EhM
[
log(1 +
hMP
σ2N +
J
1−q
)
]
−
−EhW
[
log(1 +
hWP
σ2N
)
]]+
(10)
and is rarely strictly positive (if and only if λW > λM (1 +
J
σ2
N
)). For a large jamming-power-to-noise ratio J /σ2N , this
implies that Eve’s physical channel needs to be impractically
worse than Bob’s.
However, the above scheme does not take full advantage of
the model characteristics. Recall the original assumption that
Eve can function only as a half-duplex terminal. Therefore,
whenever Eve is in Jx mode, she cannot eavesdrop – so the
whole transmission remains perfectly secret to Eve – and
conversely, if she is in Ex mode, Eve cannot simultaneously
jam the transmission.
In the next section we develop an alternative transmission
scheme, which greatly improves the achievable secrecy rate,
and is tuned to specifically exploit the active eavesdropper’s
limitations. More specifically, we “quantize” the interval [0, 1]
to which Eve’s strategy q belongs into several smaller inter-
vals, and we design an encoding/decoding strategy such that
the worst-case scenario outlined above is only applied on one
of these sub-intervals. The finer the resolution, the smaller
the loss of secrecy rate due to the uncertainty about Eve’s
strategy. To make this encoding strategy work, we use the
following techniques: (i) a posteriori Wyner-type binning, (ii)
secret key generation, (iii) block-Markov secrecy encoding and
(iv) encoding for a compound channel.
III. THE BLOCK-MARKOV WYNER (BMW) ENCODING
SCHEME
There are two main reasons why Wyner’s scheme [1] does
not work in our model. First, Alice does not know the statistics
of Bob’s channel in advance – Eve has control over the signal-
to-noise ratio of this channel. Therefore, the main channel
can be modeled as a compound channel. In order to reliably
transmit a message to Bob, Alice should use a special kind
of encoding. It was shown in [13] that the same layered
encoding technique that achieves the points on the boundary
of the capacity region for broadcast channels can also be used
for transmission over compound channels. Our scheme uses
the broadcast layered encoding of [13] to ensure that reliable
transmission is possible between Alice and Bob even in the
most unfavorable conditions. However, even if such a scheme
is used, Alice cannot know in advance which messages will
actually be decodable by Bob.
The second reason is that Alice does not know the statistics
of Eve’s channel in advance – due to the alternation between
jamming and eavesdropping, Eve’s equivalent channel is actu-
ally weaker than her physical channel. Therefore, Alice cannot
directly transmit a secret message at a rate larger than Rs,wcs
in (10), because she is not sure whether the secrecy would be
compromised or not.
5We solve these two problems by introducing a posterior-
binning Wyner-type encoding scheme. Instead of transmitting
a secret message by Wyner’s scheme, we choose to transmit
white noise, and agree on a secret key at the end of transmis-
sion, once the channel quality becomes available (a posteriori).
The secret key is then used over the next transmission interval,
to encrypt a secret message, which is then transmitted at the
same time with another sequence of white noise from which
a new secret key is distilled, and so on. Our approach is
a sequential one, and requires that Bob should be actively
involved in the secrecy encoding process. Bob’s involvement
consists of estimating and feeding back to Alice the exact
value of Eve’s strategy q. The detailed description is given
below. However, before we get to that, we need to present
some considerations on Wyner’s original encoding scheme [1],
which will help build some intuition regarding the principle
of our own scheme.
A. An alternative to Wyner’s secrecy encoding scheme for
regular passive-eavesdropper channels: a posteriori binning
We begin this discussion by studying a scenario where,
before the transmission takes place, Alice and Bob already
share a secret key (perhaps one that was agreed upon after
the previous transmission). Then in addition to the secret
message that can be encoded by Wyner’s scheme, another
secret message can be transmitted over the channel. This
latter message is encrypted using the secret key. We provide
two encoding schemes that can both achieve the simultaneous
transmission of the two secret messages.
Denote the capacities of the channels from Alice to Bob and
from Alice to Eve by CM and CE , respectively, the achievable
secrecy rate (under Wyner’s original scheme) by Rk, the rate
of the encrypted message by Rs and the codeword length by
N .
Scheme 1: Wyner’s scheme with an encrypted message.
Alice bins the codebook (containing 2NCM codewords) into
2NRk “super-bins”, such that Rk ≤ CM − CE . The first
secret message picks the index of a super-bin. The super-bin is
then binned again into 2N(CM−Rs−Rk) bins (each containing
2NRs bin-words). One of the bins is picked randomly, while
a specific codeword in that bin is picked according to the
encrypted message.
Scheme 2: The alternative encoding scheme. The codebook
is randomly binned into 2N(CM−Rs) bins – let us denote
these as “pre-bins”. Each pre-bin consists of 2NRs bin-words.
The bins are then randomly grouped into 2NRk “super-bins”,
such that each super-bin consists of 2N(CM−Rs−Rk) bins, and
where Rk is picked to satisfy Rk ≤ CM−CE . The first secret
message picks the index of a super-bin. A bin inside that super-
bin is randomly picked, and the transmitted codeword is then
picked by the encrypted message inside this bin.
The two schemes are equivalent, and they are described in
Figure 3. However, as we shall see shortly, the applicability of
Scheme 2 is more relevant to our compound channel scenario.
We should recall here that Wyner’s original encoding scheme
[1] involves a random binning of the codebook into bins
which are, each of them, good codes for Eve’s channel.
 
 
Wyner’s secrecy encoding scheme 
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Alternative encoding scheme for 
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Fig. 3. Alternative binning: Wyner’s secrecy encoding scheme with an
additional encrypted message, and the basis of our block-Markov Wyner
encoding scheme.
The actual transmission does not contain any information
about the binning itself. Hence, the same “random” binning
needs to be done separately at Alice (before the transmission
takes place) and at Bob (before he can begin decoding). The
reason why Alice performs the binning of the codebook before
transmitting is because she needs to send a meaningful secret
message over the coming frame. Therefore, the transmitted
codeword needs to belong to the particular bin indexed by the
secret message.
This suggests that if the “secret message” transmitted by
Alice had no meaning (i.e. if Alice picked this message in
a random fashion), both Alice and Bob could perform the
binning of the codebook after the transmission ends. The
“secret message” generated this way could be thought of as a
secret key for encrypting a meaningful message over the next
shared frame.
Suppose that Eve’s channel is unknown to Alice and Bob
until the transmission of the current codeword ends. The first
transmitted codeword is randomly selected from the whole un-
binned codebook. After the transmission ends, Alice and Bob
realize that the secrecy capacity was Rs. Both Bob and Alice
can now proceed to the (same) binning of the codebook. As a
result, the same single bin will be identified by both legitimate
parties as containing the transmitted message, and its index
will be secret to Eve. Clearly, the secret message conveyed
by the index of this bin has no meaning. Nevertheless, it can
be used over the next frame, as a secret key. Over the second
frame, Alice and Bob use Scheme 2 above. The codebook
is randomly binned before transmission, into 2N(CM−Rs)
bins that could each be regarded as a code for carrying the
encrypted message. One of the bins will be selected randomly,
and the encrypted message will select the exact codeword to
be transmitted. This method of transmission ensures that the
encrypted message does not overlap with the secret key that
needs to be generated at the end of the frame – the encrypted
message has nothing to do with how the bins are ultimately
chosen, as seen in Figure 3. The encrypted message may be
decodable, but not decryptable by Eve. After the transmission
of the second frame takes place, Alice and Bob realize that
the secrecy capacity was Rk. The indices of the bins are
“randomly” grouped by both Alice and Bob into 2NRk super-
6bins , and a new secret key is agreed upon by the legitimate
parties. The protocol continues in the same manner.
Three observations are in order. First, the secret key (de-
cided upon at the end of the frame) and the encrypted message
(carried by the frame) cannot overlap and maintain the same
equivocation at Eve – see the one-time pad [14]. Hence,
in the above description of the protocol, it is required that
Rs+Rk ≤ CM . Second, note that Rs = Rk (since the key is
used as a one-time pad to encrypt the secret message of the
next frame), therefore, if our previous condition holds in the
form Rs < CM/2, the transmission of the meaningful secret
message can be done at almost the secrecy capacity, with a
small initial penalty (due to the fact that the first frame does
not carry an encrypted message) which becomes negligible
as the number of transmitted frames increases.2 Third, our
new protocol can be used whenever Alice does not have a
good description of Eve’s channel over a frame until the
transmission of the corresponding codeword ends, which is
precisely the case with our current model.
B. Detailed description of the BMW encoding scheme
At this point, we restrict our analysis to particular frame
(we shall denote the span of a codeword by “frame”). How
Eve should deal with different frames will be discussed in
Theorem 5. Over this frame, we assume that Eve chooses an
arbitrary strategy q = Pr{Ex mode}. Once the transmission
of the codeword is finished, Bob can accurately evaluate the
parameter q. Bob can then feed this value back to Alice. Note
that the knowledge of q provides Alice with the statistical
description of both the main channel – determined by the
jamming probability (1− q) – and the eavesdropper’s channel
– determined by the eavesdropping probability q. Before
learning Eve’s strategy, the channel between Alice and Bob
appears like a compound channel to the legitimate parties.
The possible states of this channel are given by the possible
values of Eve’s strategy q, which belongs to the interval [0, 1].
To transform this uncountable set of possible channel states
into a finite set, we divide the interval [0, 1] to which q belongs
into n subintervals such that
[0, 1] = [q0, q1) ∪ [q1, q2) . . . ∪ [qn−1, qn] (11)
where q0 = 0 and qn = 1.
For conveying a message to Bob, Alice uses an n-level
broadcast-channel-type codebook, as in [13]. Level i is al-
located power (1 − αi)αi−1 . . . α1P (with αj ∈ [0, 1] ∀j =
1, . . . , n−1 and αn = 0) and is designed to deal with a jammer
which is on with probability 1− qi−1 over each channel use.
Also note that q0 < q1 < . . . < qn. In the remainder of this
2Assume that Eve’s channel conditions are always the same. As an example,
consider a codebook with 10000 codewords, which is used for transmitting
a secret message of length log(50) bits, according to our protocol. Take
any random frame. For transmitting the encrypted message, the codebook is
binned into 200 bins, each containing 50 codewords. One of the bins is picked
randomly, and the encrypted message picks one of the 50 codewords in the
bin. After the transmission takes place, Alice and Bob both group the original
200 bins into 50 “super-bins” (each containing 4 original bins), using the same
“recipe”. The secret key is the index of the super-bin to which the transmitted
codeword belongs. Note that the actual codeword that was transmitted inside
this super-bin is picked independently of the choice of the super-bin.
paper, we shall say that level i is “stronger” than level j if
i < j, i.e. if level i can deal with a jammer which is on more
often. The notation is fully justified by Lemma 3 below.
Denote the rates of the different encoding levels as:
R1 = EhM
[
log
(
1 +
(1− α1)PhM
σ2N + α1PhM + J
)] (12)
for the strongest level, which can deal with the case when Eve
is always in Jx mode, i.e. q = q0 = 0,
Ri = EhM
[
qi−1 log
(
1 +
+
(1− αi)αi−1 . . . α1PhM
σ2N + αi . . . α1PhM
)
+ (1− qi−1) log
(
1 +
+
(1− αi)αi−1 . . . α1PhM
σ2N + αi . . . α1PhM +
J
1−qi−1
)]
, (13)
for i = 2, 3 . . . n− 1, and finally
Rn = EhM
[
qn−1 log
(
1 +
αn−1 . . . α1PhM
σ2N
)
+
+(1− qn−1) log
(
1 +
αn−1 . . . α1PhM
σ2N +
J
1−qn−1
)]
, (14)
for the weakest level, corresponding to the case when Eve is
in Jx mode with probability 1− qn−1. Note that the encoding
levels are designed such that Bob decodes the stronger levels
first, and treats the remaining un-decoded messages as white
noise. The codebook for level i contains 2NRi codewords
of length N , generated such that each component of each
codeword represents an independent realization of a Gaussian
random variable of mean 0 and variance (1−αi)αi−1 . . . α1P ,
where αn = 0 for compatibility.
Also note that our scheme uses a constant transmit power
P = P over the whole frame. Although randomizing the
transmit power may sometimes improve the achievable secrecy
rate, this study is beyond the scope of our paper. However, we
already know that Eve’s optimal strategy is to use a constant
jamming power J on all jammed channel uses. This is
because all the rates R1, . . . , Rn defined above are convex
functions of J (see Proposition 2).
The relative strength of the encoding levels is established
by the following lemma.
Lemma 3: If Eve uses a parameter q ∈ [qi−1, qi) over a
frame, then the messages encoded in levels 1, 2, . . . , i are in-
telligible by Bob at the end of the frame. Thus the forwarding
rate from Alice to Bob is RM,i = R1 +R2 + . . .+Ri.
Proof: In order to prove that the encoding levels with
lower indices are stronger in the sense that they can deal with
a worse jamming situation, it is enough to show that Ri as
defined in (13) is an increasing function of q. In other words,
encoding level i, transmitting at a rate Ri, is intelligible by
Bob whenever Eve is in jamming mode with a probability less
than (1− qi−1). But this is a direct consequence of Lemma 7
in Appendix A, if we simply replace x by (1−αi)αi−1...α1PhM
σ2
N
+αi...α1PhM
and y by J
σ2
N
+αi...α1PhM
(see Appendix A).
7Consider the first frame, for which the transmitted mes-
sage carries no useful information, but rather its symbols
are selected in a random, i.i.d. fashion. Once Alice receives
the feedback sequence from Bob at the end of the frame,
describing Eve’s strategy (i.e. the value of q – actually, as we
shall see shortly, only the interval [qi−1, qi) that contains q is
enough information for Alice, thus the length of the feedback
sequence need not be larger than log(n)), Alice and Bob can
separately agree on the same secret message, as described in
the protocol above. This message will function as a secret
key for encrypting a meaningful secret message over the next
frame. In turn, the secret message agreed upon at the end of
the second frame can function as a secret key for the third
frame, and so on.
To formalize the intuitive description above, we begin by
stating several definitions:
• The “encrypted message” is a meaningful secret message,
encrypted with the help of a secret key that was generated
in the previous frame.
• The “secret key” is a meaningless random message,
which is perfectly secret to Eve, is agreed upon by both
Alice and Bob at the end of the frame, and can be used
for the encryption of a secret message (of at most the
same length) over the next frame.
• The term “secret key rate” refers to the rate at which
a secret key is generated at the end of a frame – the
correspondent of Wyner’s “secrecy capacity”.
• The term “achievable secrecy rate” refers to the rate of
transmission of the encrypted message.
Our encoding scheme works as follows. First, the n code-
books, indexed by i, with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} are generated as
described above, and are made available to all parties. On a
given frame, Alice transmits an encrypted message, at a rate
Rs ≤ 0.5R1 (15)
(this constraint is a result of planning ahead for Eve’s most
destructive behavior, and we show in Theorem 5 below that it
does not incur any loss of performance under Eve’s optimal
strategy) – note that the encrypted message is encrypted with
the help of a secret key generated over a previous frame. To
transmit the encrypted message, Alice randomly bins code-
book 1 into 2N(R1−Rs) bins. One of the bins (each containing
2NRs codewords) will be picked randomly (uniformly), and
the encrypted message will pick a codeword from this bin for
transmission. Recall that the reason why Alice cannot directly
bin the codebook for generating the secret key is because
Eve’s strategy (hence her equivalent channel) is unknown
until the end of the frame. An additional n − 1 codewords
are also chosen randomly, one from each of the remaining
n− 1 codebooks of rates R2, R3, . . . , Rn. Alice’s transmitted
sequence is the sum of the n codewords.
At the end of the frame, Bob feeds back to Alice the exact
value of Eve’s strategy q over that frame. In order to agree on
a secret key, Alice and Bob first need to know which encoding
levels are decodable by Bob, and which are decodable by
Eve. Only the information encoded in those levels that are
decodable by Bob, but are not perfectly decodable by Eve,
can contribute to the generation of the secret key.
Due to the construction of the code (see Lemma 3), it is
clear that under any jamming/ eavesdropping strategy, Bob will
be able to decode the strongest level first, treating the other
levels as white noise, and then perform successive interference
cancellation to decode increasingly weaker levels. However,
the same statement cannot be made for Eve. Eve’s channel
is quite different from Bob’s. While the code is designed to
handle Bob’s unknown-length interference channel, Eve sees
an interference-free channel that is totally interrupted (1−q) of
the time. In the general case, it is thus possible that the order
of strength of the encoding levels, from Eve’s perspective, is
not the same as that from Bob’s perspective. For example, for
a code with 7 levels Bob might be able to decode only levels
1, 2, 3, 4, while Eve-A may be able to perfectly decode only
levels 1, 4, 6, 7. In this case, we can re-order the levels from
Eve-A’s perspective, as 1, 4, 6, 7, 2, 3, 5. The first four levels
are decodable by Eve-A perfectly, the next two are decodable
by Bob, but not by Eve-A, and the last level is decodable by
neither. Only levels 2 and 3 can be used for generating the
secret key.
For the general case, we shall denote the ordered set of
indices corresponding to the encoding levels specified by their
rates in (12)-(14) by I , and the set of indices corresponding
to the order of strength of the encoding levels from Eve’s
perspective by Î . There exists a bijection (i.e. a re-ordering)
B : I → Î , defined as follows: (1) the set of indices
(in arbitrary order) corresponding to levels that are perfectly
decodable by Eve is denoted Ie; (2) the set of indices (in
arbitrary order) corresponding to levels that are not perfectly
decodable by Eve, but perfectly decodable by Bob is denoted
Ik; (3) the set of indices (in arbitrary order) corresponding to
levels that are not perfectly decodable by either Eve or Bob
is denoted In; (4) the ordered set Î is defined as
Î = {Ie,Ik,In}. (16)
Furthermore, we define Ine = {Ik,In} as the set of indices
corresponding to encoding levels which are not perfectly
decodable by Eve. The method of encoding is described in
Figure 4. Theorem 4 below provides the achievable secret key
rate for the general case.
Theorem 4: Consider a given quantization {qi|i ∈ Î } of
the interval [0, 1], and a given power allocation between the
corresponding encoding levels {αi|i ∈ Î }. Suppose that Eve
picks a strategy q ∈ [qi−1, qi) over a frame. Then the following
secret key rate is achievable over that frame (where the key is
generated at the end of the frame):
Rk,i =
∑
j∈Ik
[Rj −RE,j ], (17)
where:
• Rj are defined as in (12)-(14) for j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
• RE,j, j ∈ Ine are selected such that they satisfy the
following set of conditions:
RE,1 ≥ 0.5R1 if 1 ∈ Ine, (18)
(this condition states that the secret key rate assigned to
the first encoding level should not exceed 0.5R1, because
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Fig. 4. BMW encoding method – most general case, when 1 ∈ Ine.
otherwise Eve might choose q = q1, and the achievable
secrecy rate could not exceed R1−Rk – see Theorem 5)
RE,l ≤ Rl ∀l ∈ Ine (19)
(this condition ensures the feasibility of encoding),∑
l∈S
RE,l ≤ qEhW
[
log
(
1 +
+
∑
l∈S (1 − αl)αl−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N
)]
− ǫ, (20)
for any subset S of Ine, and∑
l∈Ine
RE,l = qEhW
[
log
(
1 +
+
∑
l∈Ine
(1 − αl)αl−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N
)]
− ǫ, (21)
with ǫ positive and arbitrarily close to zero (the latter two
conditions ensure the secrecy of the key).
The expressions in (20) and (21) use the convention αn = 0.
Note that the bijection B defined above also depends on Eve’s
strategy q, and hence on the interval i to which q belongs.
Therefore, the set of indices Ik depends on i.
The following observations are in order.
(1) Sometimes (when Eve’s channel is much worse than
Bob’s) the system of inequalities in (18) - (21) may have
no feasible solution. Under these circumstances, one possible
approach is to find a solution of the inequalities in (19) -
(21) (i.e. to ignore the condition in (18)). This would distill a
secret key at a rate larger than 0.5R1. Nevertheless, the entire
secret key may be used by time sharing. For example, for
Ine = {1}, we can take RE,1 = 0.25R1 for two consecutive
frames (the first level would generate 2×0.75NR1 = 1.5NR1
secret key bits, and transmit only 2 × 0.25NR1 = 0.5NR1
bits of the secret message), for the third frame we can use the
entire level 1 (at rate R1) to transmit an encrypted message (of
length 1.5NR1−0.5NR1 = NR1 bits). With this observation,
in the remainder of this work we shall only focus on the cases
in which (18) - (21) admit feasible solutions.
(2) Since the fundamentals of our approach to the proof of
this theorem reside in Wyner’s original results [1], we are
currently constrained to involving all users in Ine in the
generation of the secret key. That is, we are subject to the
constraint in (21), and its essentiality will be reflected in the
proof. Although a larger secrecy rate might be achieved by
involving only a proper subset of Ine in the generation of the
secret key, this kind of improvement is beyond the purpose of
this paper, and will be considered for further research.
(3) Although similar-flavor results have been obtained in
[15], [16], our results are quite different because they involve
“users” which are not decodable by Bob. A discussion of the
issues addressed in [15], [16] is provided in Appendix B.
Proof: The proof is based on two observations. First,
we have already shown that if the secret message is not a
meaningful one, the binning of Wyner’s scheme can be done
at the end of the transmission, when the statistical properties of
Eve’s channel are known to both Bob and (through feedback)
to Alice. To accomplish this, both Alice and Bob will have
to memorize a set of “binning recipes”, one for each possible
value of Eve’s strategy (actually only the interval [qi−1, qi) to
which q belongs, and not the exact value of q, matters in our
case). This is a bit different from Wyner’s original scheme
[1] where only one such recipe needed to be memorized.
Therefore, in the remainder of the proof, we can and shall
treat the process of distilling a secret key as if Eve’s channel
were known to all parties in advance, without losing any
generality. That is, for the sake of using familiar notation and
terminology, we shall talk about “encoding” a secret key at
Alice, for “transmission” to Bob, although the secret key is
only agreed upon at the end of the frame.
Second, a secret key K =
⋃
j∈Ine
Kj is “encoded” into all
encoding levels j belonging to Ine, i.e. over levels belonging
to both Ik and In. Recall that Bob cannot decode the levels
of In. We do this because it is easier to prove that the whole
key K is secret to Eve. Once this is accomplished, we shall
follow a simple argument of [15] (which we replicate in (33)
for completeness) to show that the sub-key ⋃j∈Ik Kj , which
can actually be decoded and used by Bob, is also perfectly
9secret.
We use a separate secret key encoding for each of Alice’s
encoding levels in Ine. As a consequence, Eve sees a fast
fading multiple access channel, where the transmitters have
different power constraints, but the same channel coefficient.
In this context, we note that the conditions set forth for the
rates Rj,E in (20) and (21) are exactly the conditions necessary
for these rates to belong to the boundary of the capacity region
of Eve’s equivalent multiple access channel. The problem of
a multiple access eavesdropper AWGN channel was discussed
in [15]. However, some of the results in [15] do not necessarily
reflect our views. We provide an explanation of this assertion
in Appendix B. Therefore, we continue with describing a
correct encoding method which yields an achievable secret
key rate.
For any level of encoding j ∈ Ine, we encode a secret
key Kj according to Wyner’s scheme [1], [17]. That is,
if j 6= 1, we randomly bin the randomly generated N -
dimensional codebook of 2NRj codewords into 2N(Rj−RE,j)
bins. The secret message corresponds to the index of the bin,
while the exact codeword in the bin is randomly picked. The
rates RE,j are selected as in the statement of the theorem.
If j = 1 ∈ Ine (recall that codebook 1 was already
binned once), Bob generates the bins in two steps: first he
identifies the 2N(R1−Rs) bins used for transmitting Alice’s
encrypted message, and then he randomly groups these bins
into 2N(R1−RE,1) larger bins. A secret message is encoded
into the indices of the resulting larger bins.
Denote the resulting N -dimensional output sequence of
level j by Xj , and denote the p-th component of Xj by
Xj(p). Also denote the union of the N -sequences from all
levels (including those from Ie which do not carry a secret
key) by X = ⋃
j∈Î Xj . The notation X(p) now denotes
the n-dimensional set consisting of the p-th components
of the output sequences from every encoding level, that is
X(p) =
⋃
j∈Î Xj(p). Eve’s received sequence is now Z =
HW ·
∑
j∈Î Xj+Q, where HW is the N -dimensional vector
of channel realizations corresponding to the N symbols, Q is
Eve’s N -dimensional additive white Gaussian noise sequence ,
and (·) denotes component-wise multiplication. The p-th scalar
components of these vectors will be denoted by Z(p), HW (p)
and Q(p), respectively. The notation XS will be used for the
union of the output sequences corresponding to levels with
indices in S , i.e. XS =
⋃
j∈S Xj , and the notation for the
p-th components is extended correspondingly.
Eve’s equivocation about the secret key can be written as
follows
∆ =
H(K|Z,HW )
H(K)
=
H(K,Z,HW )−H(Z,HW )
H(K)
(a)
=
=
H(K) +H(Z,HW ,X|K)
H(K)
−
−
H(X|Z,HW ,K) +H(Z,HW )
H(K)
(b)
=
=
H(K) +H(Z,HW |X,K) +H(X|K)
H(K)
−
−
H(X|Z,HW ,K) +H(Z,HW )
H(K)
(c)
=
= 1−
I(X;Z,HW )− I(X;Z,HW |K)
H(K)
, (22)
where both (a) and (b) result from the chain rule for entropy,
while (c) from the fact that K → X → Z form a Markov
chain.
Denote D = I(X;Z,HW )− I(X;Z,HW |K). We can now
write
I(X;Z,HW ) = H(XIe) +H(XIne)−
−H(XIe |Z,HW )−H(XIne |XIe ,Z,HW ), (23)
H(X|K) = H(XIe) +H(XIne |K), (24)
and
H(X|Z,HW ,K) =
= H(XIe |Z,HW ,K) +H(XIne |XIe ,Z,HW ,K) ≤
≤ H(XIe |Z,HW ) +H(XIne |XIe ,Z,HW ,K), (25)
where we used the fact that {Xj : j ∈ I } are all independent
of each other, and that conditioning reduces entropy. Substi-
tuting (23)-(25) in the expression of D above, and noting that
H(XIne) = H(XIne|XIe), we obtain
D ≤ I(XIne ;Z,HW |XIe)−H(XIne |K) +
+H(XIne|XIe ,Z,HW ,K). (26)
By the code construction, and recalling that the rates RE,j in
the statement of the theorem are picked such that they belong
to the boundary of the capacity region of Eve’s equivalent
multiple access channel (they satisfy (21)), we can use Fano’s
inequality, the union bound and arguments similar to those
used in driving equation (78) of [1], to upper bound
H(XIne |XIe ,Z,HW ,K) ≤ NδN , (27)
where δN → 0 as N →∞. This is quite intuitive, since given
the secret key, the other information is transmitted by Alice
using codes which are good for Eve’s multiple access channel.
In fact
δN =
∑
j∈Ine
1
N
h(pe,j) + pe,jRE,j , (28)
where pe,j is the probability of error for the layer-j such code,
and h(·) is the binary entropy function h(x) = −x log2(x)−
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(1−x) log2(1−x). Since the random, complementary-to-the-
secret-key information is carried by these codes at a total rate
almost equal to the capacity of the virtual MAC between Alice
and Eve, corresponding to the encoding levels in Ine, we also
have
H(XIne |K) = NqEhW
[
log
(
1 +
+
∑
j∈Ine
(1 − αj)αj−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N
)]
−Nǫ. (29)
To upper bound the first term on the right hand side of (26),
we write
I(XIne ;Z,HW |XIe) =
= H(Z,HW |XIe)−H(Z,HW |XI )
(a)
=
= H(Z,HW |XIe)−NH(Z(p),HW (p)|XI (p))
(b)
≤
≤ NH(Z(p),HW (p)|XIe(p))−
−NH(Z(p),HW (p)|XI (p)) =
= NI(XIne(p);Z(p),HW (p)|XIe(p))
(c)
≤
≤ NqEhW
[
log
(
1 +
+
∑
j∈Ine
(1− αj)αj−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N
]
. (30)
Equality in (a) follows from the fact that the channel is
memoryless, (b) follows from the chain rule for entropy and
the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, and (c)
is obtained by using Jensen’s inequality, as in the proof of the
converse to the AWGN channel coding theorem in Section 9.2.
of [18].
Putting together (27), (29) and (30), we obtain
D ≤ N(ǫ + δN), (31)
which in turn implies
∆ ≥ 1−N
ǫ+ δN
H(K)
. (32)
Since H(K)
N
is a constant, the right-hand side of (32) converges
to 1 as N → ∞. Thus, we have proved that the key K
remains secret from Eve as long as the codeword length N
goes to infinity. However, note that the entire key K cannot
be understood by Bob. In fact, Bob and Alice can only agree
on the part KIk of the key. But the secrecy of the entire key
guarantees the secrecy of any part of the key [15]. For the sake
of completeness, we restate the following proof from [15].
H(KIk |Z,HW )
(a)
=
= H(KIne|Z,HW )−H(KIn |KIk ,Z,HW )
(b)
≥
≥ H(K)−N(ǫ+ δN )−
−H(KIn |KIk ,Z,HW )
(c)
≥
≥ H(KIk) +H(KIn)−N(ǫ+ δN )−
−H(KIn |KIk ,Z,HW )
(d)
≥
≥ H(KIk)−N(ǫ+ δN ), (33)
where (a) follows from the chain rule, (b) from (32) and
the definition of ∆, (c) from the independence of the keys
from different encoding levels, and (d) from the fact that
conditioning does not increase entropy.
This results in
H(KIk |Z,HW )
H(KIk)
≥ 1−N
ǫ+ δN
H(KIk)
→ 1 (34)
as N →∞ (because H(KIk )
N
is a constant). Therefore, a per-
fectly secret key can be distilled from the random information
transmitted by the encoding levels in Ik.
We have seen the best achievable secret key rate if q ∈
[qi−1, qi). The next theorem provides Eve’s optimal strategy,
i.e. which is the most destructive value of q under the present
conservative scenario, and also Alice’s best achievable secrecy
rate under this eavesdropper strategy. Note that although the
game between Eve and the legitimate parties Alice and Bob
is a dynamic one, where Bob and Alice need to re-evaluate
their strategies over each frame, the following result can be
thought of as some form of equilibrium. Indeed, under our
assumptions, it is sub-optimal for either Eve or the Alice/Bob
pair to deviate from the following strategies.
Theorem 5: Consider a given quantization {qi|i ∈ Î } of
the interval [0, 1], and a given power allocation between the
corresponding encoding levels {αi|i ∈ Î }.
(1) If Eve’s optimal value of q is such that q ∈ [qi−1, qi),
then q is arbitrarily close to qi.
(2) Eve’s optimal strategy q under our conservative scenario
is the same over all frames.
(3) Denote the achievable secret key rates by {Rk,i : i =
1, 2, . . . , n}, where Rk,i is the best achievable secret key rate
given by Theorem 4, under q = qi. Then Eve’s optimal
strategy is qiopt = argminqi{Rk,i}, if minqi{Rk,i} < 0.5R1,
and qiopt = q1, otherwise.
(4) Under Eve’s optimal strategy, the maximum achievable
secrecy rate (under the current setup) is
Rs = min{0.5R1, Rk,iopt}. (35)
(5) There is no loss of performance incurred by restricting
the rate of the encrypted message to Rs ≤ 0.5R1 in (15).
Proof: (1) Using Theorem 4, it is easy to check that, given
q ∈ [qi−1, qi), the achievable secret key rate is a decreasing
function of q. Therefore, if q ∈ [qi−1, qi), Eve’s optimal
strategy is to pick q arbitrarily close to qi.
(2),(3),(4) We have already mentioned that our encoding
strategy restricts the rate of the encrypted message to Rs ≤
0.5R1, by restricting the rate of generation of the secret key
to Rk ≤ 0.5R1. If minqi{Rk,i} is achieved by qiopt and is
less than 0.5R1, then by switching to a different strategy qd,
Eve will only increase the rate of generation of the secret key,
and hence the rate of transmission of the encrypted message.
On the other hand, if minqi{Rk,i} ≥ 0.5R1, then no matter
what Eve’s strategy is, the secrecy rate will be constrained by
the encoding scheme to 0.5R1.
(5) The constraint introduced by the encoding scheme is a
conservative one. Although the secret key may be generated by
multiple layers, at the end of a frame, the encrypted message
is transmitted only by the first encoding level. This is because
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neither Alice, nor Bob know the channel quality in advance,
and thus, to ensure reliable decoding of the secret message,
they have to plan for the worse. For example, Eve might
choose to constantly play a strategy q ∈ [0, q1), which implies
that Bob will only be able to decode level 1 of the code.
This message, transmitted at a maximum rate of R1, has
to carry the encrypted message and generate a secret key,
simultaneously. But since Eve’s strategy remains in [0, q1)
over the next frames, the rate of the encrypted message cannot
exceed 0.5R1 – there would not be enough secret key bits to
encrypt it. Therefore, the strategy q ∈ [0, q1) can function
as a “default” state for Eve, where she could take refuge if
the achievable secrecy rate under any other strategy exceeded
0.5R1.
Theorems 4 and 5 above offer a good description of the
achievable secrecy rates. However, in Theorem 4 we assumed
that the set Ie of indices corresponding to the levels that
are perfectly decodable by Eve, and the sets Ik and In are
readily available. Due to the fact that our encoding scheme is
designed such that Bob should perform successive interference
cancellation, the set of levels that are not decodable by Bob is
easy to compute. However, the characterization of the set Ie
and its complement Ine is not straightforward. The following
proposition shows how these sets can be found. Its proof
results from Lemma 8 in Appendix C.
Proposition 6: The maximal set of indices Ie correspond-
ing to the levels that are perfectly decodable by Eve is the
largest of the sets Ve for which∑
j∈S
Rj ≤ qEhW
[
log
(
1 +
+
∑
j∈S (1 − αj)αj−1 . . . α1PhW
σ2N +
∑
i∈V ce
(1− αi)αi−1 . . . α1PhW
)]
, ∀S ⊆ Ve, (36)
where V ce is the complement of Ve with respect to Î
C. On the Complexity of the Algorithm: Selecting {αi} and
{qi}.
Our results so far facilitate the computation of an achievable
secrecy rate, given a partition of the interval [0, 1] expressed
in terms of the parameters {q1, q2, . . . , qn−1}, and a power
allocation between the encoding levels, given by the parame-
ters {α1, α2, . . . , αn−1}. If Alice and Bob wish to exploit the
full secrecy capabilities of the model, they should perform a
maximization of the achievable secrecy rate with respect to
the parameters {(qi, αi) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1}.
The optimization problem requires a high complexity nu-
merical algorithm. Recall that for each value of the parameter
vector {(qi, αi) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1} we need to find the
set Ie as in the Proposition 6, which involves combinatorial
complexity. Given Ie, we need to find the optimal set of
encoding layers that should be involved in the elaboration of
the secret key. The following example illustrates the steps of
the algorithm for the least involved scenario: that of n = 2.
A simple case: n = 2
We start by selecting a value for the parameter vector
(q1, α1). The transmission rates for the two encoding levels
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Fig. 5. Eve’s equivalent-MAC capacity region.
become:
R1 = EhM
[
log
(
1 +
(1− α1)PhM
σ2N + α1PhM + J
)]
, (37)
and
R2 = EhM
[
q1 log
(
1 +
α1PhM
σ2N
)
+
+(1− q1) log
(
1 +
α1PhM
σ2N +
J
1−q1
)]
. (38)
To illustrate all possible cases, we shall refer to Figure 5,
where we represented the (equivalent-) MAC capacity region
of Eve. Although this region depends on Eve’s strategy q ∈
{q1, 1}, we shall use it as a reference frame, in which the
tuple (R1, R2) (which is fixed as above) can occupy different
positions, depending on q.
Depending on Eve’s strategy q ∈ {q1, 1}, we have the
following two algorithms:
If q = q1, only level 1 is intelligible to Bob.
1) If
q1EhW
[
log
(
1 +
(1− α1)PhW
σ2N
)]
≥ R1, (39)
q1EhW
[
log
(
1 +
α1PhW
σ2N
)]
≥ R2, (40)
q1EhW
[
log
(
1 +
PhW
σ2N
)]
≥ R1 +R2, (41)
or, equivalently, if the tuple (R1, R2) is inside the
capacity region of Figure 5, then Ie = {1, 2} (i.e. both
levels are perfectly decodable by Eve.) In this case, no
secret key may be generated, and no secret message may
be transmitted.
2) Else, if
q1EhW
[
log
(
1 +
(1− α1)PhW
σ2N + α1PhW
)]
≥ R1, (42)
which, along with the condition that we are outside the
capacity region implies
q1EhW
[
log
(
1 +
α1PhW
σ2N
)]
< R2, (43)
that is (R1, R2) is in the region Ω2 of Figure 5, then
Ie = {1}.But since level 2 is not intelligible to Bob,
no secret key may be generated.
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3) Else, if
q1EhW
[
log
(
1 +
α1PhW
σ2N + (1− α1)PhW
)]
≥
≥ R2, (44)
which (since not in the capacity region) implies that
(R1, R2) is in Ω1, i.e.
q1EhW
[
log
(
1 +
(1− α1)PhW
σ2N
)]
< R1, (45)
then Ie = {2}. For this scenario, only level 1 may
generate a secret key at a rate equal to min{0.5R1, R1−
q1EhW
[
log
(
1 + (1−α1)PhW
σ2
N
)]
}.
4) The remaining case is when neither of the two en-
coding levels is intelligible to Eve. Under this as-
sumption, both levels 1 and 2 may be involved in
the generation of the secret key. A secret key may
be generated at rate min{0.5R1, R1 − RE,1}, where
RE,1 is either equal to q1EhW
[
log
(
1 + (1−α1)PhW
α1PhW+σ2N
)]
if (R1, R2) is in Ω4
⋃
Ω5 of Figure 5, or RE,1 =
q1EhW
[
log
(
1 + PhW
σ2
N
)]
} − R2 if (R1, R2) is in
Ω3
⋃
ΩN .
If q = 1, both levels are intelligible to Bob.
1) If (R1, R2) is in Eve’s capacity region, i.e.
EhW
[
log
(
1 +
(1− α1)PhW
σ2N
)]
≥ R1, (46)
EhW
[
log
(
1 +
α1PhW
σ2N
)]
≥ R2, (47)
EhW
[
log
(
1 +
PhW
σ2N
)]
≥ R1 +R2, (48)
then Ie = {1, 2} (i.e. both levels are perfectly decod-
able by Eve), and no secret key may be generated.
2) Else, if (R1, R2) ∈ Ω2, i.e.
EhW
[
log
(
1 +
(1− α1)PhW
σ2N + α1PhW
)]
≥ R1, (49)
and
EhW
[
log
(
1 +
α1PhW
σ2N
)]
< R2, (50)
then Ie = {1}. For this scenario, level 2 may generate
a secret key at rate R2 −EhW
[
log
(
1 + α1PhW
σ2
N
)]
.
3) Else, if (R1, R2) ∈ Ω1, i.e.
EhW
[
log
(
1 +
α1PhW
σ2N + (1− α1)PhW
)]
≥ R2, (51)
and
EhW
[
log
(
1 +
(1− α1)PhW
σ2N
)]
< R1, (52)
then Ie = {2}. For this scenario, level 1 may
generate a secret key at rate min{0.5R1, R1 −
EhW
[
log
(
1 + (1−α1)PhW
σ2
N
)]
}.
4) When neither of the two encoding levels is intel-
ligible to Eve, both levels may be involved in the
generation of the secret key. We can achieve the se-
cret key rate given by R1 + R2 − RE,1 − RE,2,
where RE,1 and RE,2 are chosen such that RE,1 +
RE,2 = EhW
[
log
(
1 + PhW
σ2
N
)]
, 0.5R1 ≤ RE,1 ≤
min{R1,EhW
[
log
(
1 + (1−α1)PhW
σ2
N
)]
}, and RE,2 ≤
min{R2,EhW
[
log
(
1 + α1PhW
σ2
N
)]
}, with the observa-
tions following Theorem 4.
Since we are currently investigating the conservative sce-
nario, Eve will pick the strategy (q = q1 or q = 1) which
yields the minimum secrecy rate. We have to find the value of
(q1, α1) which yields the largest such minimum. Equivalently,
the optimal (q1, α1) will provide equal achievable secrecy rates
for q = q1 and for q = 1.
It is important to note that, although the algorithm may
be extremely complex, it needs to be solved only once for the
desired value of n. The optimal parameters may then be stored
at both legitimate parties.
In an effort to reduce the complexity of the algorithm, we
propose to pick the parameters {(qi) : i = 1, . . . , n− 1} such
that {q0, q1, q2, . . . , qn−1, qn} are all equally spaced, which
corresponds to a uniform partition (or “quantization”) of the
interval [0, 1]. With this rule in place, the optimization needs to
be performed only over the (n− 1) parameters α1, . . . , αn−1,
hence the complexity is reduced by half.
From our numerical results for n = 2 and n = 3 (see Figure
8), the loss of optimality due to the uniform partition of [0, 1]
is not very significant. We conjecture that, as n increases, this
loss of performance should become negligible. Our remark is
based on the fact that as n →∞ the optimal partition of the
interval [0, 1] approaches a uniform partition (with a vanishing
step).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In Figures 6 and 7 we show the improvement of our
BMW secrecy encoding scheme over the worst-case scenario
approach of (10). Note that if Eve’s channel coefficient is close
(statistically) to Bob’s – the case of Figure 6 – the worst-case
approach of (10) – or equivalently the case n = 1 – cannot
achieve a positive secrecy rate.
However, even Wyner’s pure scheme implemented as in (10)
can achieve a positive secrecy rate if λW > λM (1 + Jσ2
N
), as
discussed in Section II – see Figure7. The merit of our novel
encoding scheme is significant.
The best-case (or “minimax”) scenario solution of [12] is
given in both Figures 6 and 7 for comparison. The “minimax”
scenario describes a situation when Alice and Bob can know
Eve’s strategy in advance (or, in game-theoretic terms, Alice
plays first). Although this scenario may not seem like a rea-
sonable model, it serves as an upper-bound on the achievable
secrecy rates.
Figure 8 depicts the performance of the BMW secrecy
encoding scheme when the partition of the interval [0, 1] into
intervals of the form [qi−1, q1) is done uniformly, i.e. the
parameters q0, q1, q2, . . . , qn are equally spaced, instead of
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Fig. 6. Achievable secrecy rates with our BMW secrecy encoding scheme.
Exponentially distributed channel coefficients with λM = 0.3, λW = 0.8,
J = 5, σ2
N
= 1.
0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
transmitter power P
Ac
hi
ev
ab
le
 s
ec
re
cy
 ra
te
s
Achievable secrecy rates vs. transmitter power constraint. σN
2
=1, J=5, λM=0.2, λW=1.5
 
 
sequential scheme, n=2
sequential scheme, n=1
sequential scheme, n=3
minimax solution
Fig. 7. Achievable secrecy rates with our BMW secrecy encoding scheme.
Exponentially distributed channel coefficients with λM = 0.2, λW = 1.5,
J = 5, σ2
N
= 1.
being picked in an optimal way. We note that the degradation
of the achievable secrecy rates is quite small and decreasing
as n increases. Figures 9 and 10 show the design parameters
used for obtaining the results of Figure 8.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have seen how an active eavesdropper can seriously
decrease the achievable secrecy rate in a classical scenario of a
fast-fading AWGN channel with an eavesdropper. Our scenario
models the most conservative and most practical approach to
the active eavesdropper.
We have seen that, in order to take advantage of the
non-duplex nature of the eavesdropper’s terminal, we need
a more elaborate, block-Markov Wyner encoding scheme.
While in the classical eavesdropper scenario the legitimate
receiver is completely passive, our scheme relies heavily on the
cooperation of the receiver. That means that at the end of each
frame, Bob is required to feed back to Alice information about
Eve’s strategy, and then, based on this information, replicate
Alice’s efforts to distill a secret key.
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Fig. 8. Achievable secrecy rates with our BMW secrecy encoding scheme,
with uniform and with optimized partition of the interval [0, 1]. Exponentially
distributed channel coefficients with λM = 0.2, λW = 1.5, J = 5, σ2N = 1.
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Fig. 9. The encoding parameters q1 and α1 for the case n = 2: optimal
and uniform partition of the interval [0,1]. Exponentially distributed channel
coefficients with λM = 0.2, λW = 1.5, J = 5, σ2N = 1.
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Although the performance of our BMW scheme remains
below the secreccy rate upper-bound provided by the best-case
scenario of [12], the improvement it brings over the passive-
receiver solution is quite significant.
APPENDIX A
A USEFUL LEMMA
The following lemma is used several times in this paper.
Lemma 7: The function
f(q) = q log(1 + x) + (1− q) log
(
1 +
x
1 + y1−q
)
, (53)
where x, y > 0, is strictly increasing and strictly convex as a
function of q.
Proof: It is straightforward to compute
df(q)
dq
= log
(
(1 + x)
1 + y1−q
1 + x+ y1−q
)
−
−
xy
1− q
·
1
(1 + y1−q )(1 + x+
y
1−q )
, (54)
and
d2f(q)
dq2
=
xy
(1−q)2
(1 + y1−q )(1 + x+
y
1−q )
·
·
[
1−
1 + x− ( y(1−q) )
2
(1 + y1−q )(1 + x+
y
1−q )
]
. (55)
Since 1 + y1−q > 1 and 1 + x − (
y
(1−q) )
2 < 1 + x + y1−q ,
we can state that d
2f(q)
dq2
> 0. Therefore, df(q)
dq
is a strictly
increasing function of q. But evaluating the first derivative in
q = 0 we get
df
dq
(0) =
= log
(
(1 + x)(1 + y)
1 + x+ y
)
−
xy
(1 + y)(1 + x+ y)
=
= log
(
1 +
xy
1 + x+ y
)
−
xy
(1 + x+ y)(1 + y)
(a)
≥
≥
xy
(1 + x)(1 + y)
−
xy
(1 + x+ y)(1 + y)
(b)
> 0, (56)
where inequality (a) follows from log(1 + β) > β1+β for any
β > −1, β 6= 0, if we replace β = xy1+x+y , while inequality
(b) follows since x > 0. Therefore df(q)
dq
is always strictly
positive and strictly increasing, which implies that f(q) is
strictly increasing and strictly convex.
APPENDIX B
COMMENTS ON PREVIOUSLY EXISTING RESULTS ON MAC
SECRECY
The most notable recent results on the achievable secrecy
rates for MACs are provided by [15] and [16]. Although the
papers bring unquestionable contributions relevant to our own
scenario, such as the concepts of individual and collective
secrecy, and the improvement of the secrecy sum-rates by
noise injection (cooperative jamming), we feel that there
are some misleading issues related to their proposed secrecy
encoding method. This why we re-formulate the collective-
secrecy [15] encoding method in the current paper.
The encoding method of [15] uses a separate secret message
encoding for each user, much like our own encoding scheme.
However, unlike the present paper, the secrecy encoding of
[15] employs a “superposition encoding scheme” (see Section
III of both [15] and [16]). In the following paragraphs, we
provide a brief description of this technique.
Take one user with power constraint P . The user generates
two independent codebooks, in the following manner: the first
codebook contains 2NRs N -dimensional codewords, and each
letter of each codeword is independently generated, according
to the realization of a Gaussian random variable of zero mean
and variance αP ; the second codebook contains 2NR0 N -
dimensional codewords, and each letter of each codeword
is independently generated, according to the realization of a
Gaussian random variable of zero mean and variance (1−α)P .
The secret message – transmitted at rate Rs – picks a codeword
from the first codebook, while another codeword is randomly
picked from the second codebook. The message transmitted
by this user is the summation of the two codewords.
At a first glance, it appears that the transmitted message
belongs to a codebook of 2N(Rs+R0) N -dimensional code-
words, in which each letter of each codeword is the realization
of a Gaussian random variable of variance P . Moreover, the
codebook is already binned, like in Wyner’s scheme [1], [17].
However, if the transmitted message is completely decod-
able by Bob, the rates Rs and R0 should be situated within
the corresponding MAC rate region. For example, if we had
a Gaussian eavesdropper channel where the AWGN variances
were 1 for both channels, while the absolute squared channel
coefficients are 1 for the main channel and hk for the eaves-
dropper’s channel, the rates should satisfy Rs ≤ log [1 + αP ],
R0 ≤ log [1 + (1− α)P ], and Rs+R0 ≤ log [1 + P ]. But the
first two conditions do not appear in [15].
Even if these conditions were satisfied, we believe that the
“superposition encoding scheme” of [15] is not equivalent to
Wyner’s scheme. The key to Wyner’s scheme is that each
bin makes a “good” codebook for the eavesdropper. That is,
given the secret key and the eavesdropper’s received message,
the bin chosen by the secret key conveys information to the
eavesdropper at a rate arbitrarily close to the eavesdropper’s
channel capacity.
For the same toy model as above, the rate of each bin should
be arbitrarily close to log [1 + Phk]. However, under the “su-
perposition encoding scheme” of [15], this rate cannot exceed
log [1 + αPhk]
3
. To achieve the capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel, α would need to be arbitrarily close to 1. But then
the codebook associated with the secret message would be
generated with arbitrarily small power. If a positive secrecy
rate Rs is still desired, the intelligibility of the secret message
at the legitimate receiver is compromised. Thus, we do not
expect that the proposed encoding method of [15] will achieve
the secrecy rates claimed therein.
3Note that although the second codebook has a rate equal to log [1 + Phk]
in [15], this rate is not sustainable by the eavesdropper’s channel with power
constraint αP .
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Fig. 11. The capacity region of a MAC.
At this point, we want to emphasize the fact that, except for
the encoding method, the results of [15] and [16] are correct.
However, our Theorem 4 is quite different than these results.
Our secrecy-encoding scheme involves in the generation of
the secret key the levels that are non-decodable by either
Eve or Bob. In the context of [15] and [16], this would be
equivalent to having some users transmit at rates not supported
by the receiver, but still help with the transmission of secrecy.
Although this approach would not make much sense in [15]
and [16], it fits perfectly with the constraints of our compound-
channel-like scenario.
APPENDIX C
PROOF AND MOTIVATION OF PROPOSITION 6
As we stated earlier, from Eve’s point of view, the different
encoding levels are very similar to different users. Therefore,
Eve’s channel can be seen as a multiple access channel (MAC),
with n users, each with a different power, but all sharing
the same channel coefficient. However, to the best of our
knowledge, in the current literature there is no treatment of
the achievable rate region for a set of users when the other
users are not decodable.
To motivate Proposition 6, we look at the two-user Gaussian
MAC, the capacity region of which is given in Figure 11. Let
the capacity of the first user’s channel (when user 2 is absent)
be C1 = log(1+P1/σ2N ), and the capacity of the second user’s
channel (when user 1 is absent) be C2 = log(1 + P2/σ2N ).
We know that the achievable rate region is given by all pairs
(R1, R2) that satisfy [18] R1 ≤ C1, R2 ≤ C2 and R1+R2 ≤
log(1+(P1+P2)/σ
2
N ). This implies that when user 2 transmits
at a rate R2 = C2, user 1 should be decoded by treating
the second user as white Gaussian noise, and by performing
successive interference cancellation. The first user’s maximum
decodable transmission rate is then R1 = log(1 + P1/(σ2N +
P2)).
However, it is not straightforward to see whether, when the
second user uses a randomly generated Gaussian codebook at
a rate R2 > C2 and cannot be decoded, the first user may
employ a transmission rate larger than log(1+P1/(σ2N +P2))
(region Ω4) . To justify our question, consider the following
“decoding” method. First, a list of possible codewords is
computed for user 2, by treating user 1 as interference, and
selecting only those codewords of the second user’s codebook
that have a non-zero a posteriori probability. This list may
be shorter than the second user’s whole codebook, and the a
posteriori probability of the codewords therein may be non-
uniform. Then, using this information about user 2, we attempt
decoding for user 1. Proposition 6 states that this method is
no better than the one which treats user 2 as white noise.
In the remainder of this appendix we formulate and prove
the following lemma, which considers a general Gaussian
MAC, and from which the proof of Proposition 6 is straight-
forward to derive.
Lemma 8: Consider a Gaussian MAC with users j ∈ I ,
each with average power constraint Pj , j ∈ I , and each
transmitting at a rate Rj , j ∈ I . Let the variance of the ad-
ditive white complex Gaussian noise be σ2N . We are interested
in the maximum number of users that are decodable by the
receiver. The maximal set of indices Ie ⊆ I corresponding
to these users that are perfectly decodable by the receiver is
the largest of the sets Ve for which∑
j∈S
Rj ≤ log
(
1 +
∑
j∈S Pj
σ2N +
∑
i∈Vne
Pi
)
, ∀S ⊆ Ve, (57)
where Vne is the complement of Ve with respect to I
Proof: Denote the largest of the sets Ve for which (57)
holds by V ∗e , and its complement in I by V ∗ne. Assume that
V ∗ne is non-empty (if it is empty, the result of the lemma is
trivial). Note that all users in V ∗e are decodable. However, if all
users of V ∗ne were decodable, then the property in (57) would
hold for I , hence V ∗e would no longer be the largest set with
that property. Therefore, not all users of V ∗ne are decodable.
For the users in V ∗ne, consider the the rate-region where:
(1) none of the users can be decoded by treating the others as
interference, (2) if any one user were decodable (i.e. provided
to the receiver by a genie), then all other users would be
decodable and (3) not all users are decodable. This region
can be characterized as
ΩN =
{
(Ri)i∈V ∗ne |Rj > log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2N +
∑
k∈V ∗ne\{j}
Pk
)
,
∀j ∈ V ∗ne,
∑
j∈S
Rj ≤ log
(
1 +
∑
j∈S Pj
σ2N
)
, ∀S ⊂ V ∗ne \ {i},
∀i ∈ V ∗ne,
∑
j∈V ∗ne
Rj > log
(
1 +
∑
j∈V ∗ne
Pj
σ2N
)}
(for |V ∗ne| = 2, ΩN is represented in Figure 11).
Next we prove that such a rate region is non-empty for the
users in V ∗ne. To accomplish this, we show by mathematical
induction that∑
j∈S
log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2N +
∑
k∈V ∗ne\{j}
Pk
)
≤
≤ log
(
1 +
∑
j∈S Pj
σ2N
)
, ∀S ⊂ V ∗ne, (58)
which means that if the first condition in the definition of ΩN
holds for all j ∈ S , this does not prevent the second condition
in the definition of ΩN from holding as well.
For S = {i} we have
log
(
1 +
Pi
σ2N +
∑
j∈V ∗ne\{i}
Pj
)
< log
(
1 +
Pi
σ2N
)
. (59)
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If (58) holds for a set S , that is∑
j∈S
log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2N +
∑
k∈V ∗ne\{j}
Pk
)
≤
≤ log
(
1 +
∑
j∈S Pj
σ2N
)
, (60)
then adding another user r to S we get∑
j∈S
⋃
{r}
log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2N +
∑
k∈V ∗ne\{j}
Pk
)
≤
≤ log
(
1 +
∑
j∈S Pj
σ2N
)
+
+ log
(
1 +
Pr
σ2N +
∑
j∈V ∗ne\{r}
Pj
)
=
= log
(∑j∈S Pj + σ2N
σ2N
σ2N +
∑
k∈V ∗ne
Pk
σ2N +
∑
k∈V ∗ne\{r}
Pk
)
≤
≤ log
(
1 +
∑
j∈S
⋃
{r} Pj
σ2N
)
, (61)
where the last inequality holds because it is equivalent to the
inequality
σ2N +
∑
k∈V ∗ne
Pk
σ2N +
∑
k∈V ∗ne\{r}
Pk
≤
σ2N +
∑
j∈S
⋃
{r} Pj
σ2N +
∑
j∈S Pj
, (62)
which is equivalent to the inequality ∑
k∈V ∗ne
Pk
∑
j∈S
Pj
 ≤
≤
 ∑
k∈V ∗ne\{r}
Pk
 ∑
j∈S
⋃
{r}
Pj
 , (63)
which holds because
∑
k∈V ∗ne
Pk −
∑
j∈S Pj > Pr.
At this point we know that ΩN is a feasible (non-empty)
rate region for the users in V ∗ne and (by construction) no user
of ΩN can be decodable. Note that the first condition in the
definition of ΩN , i.e. that none of the users can be decoded
by treating the others as interference, follows naturally for
all users in V ∗ne (see the definition of V ∗e above), while the
third condition, i.e. that not all users are decodable, is also
characteristic of V ∗ne, as we have already shown. Thus, the
only restrictive condition on ΩN is an upper bound on the
rates (the second condition). In other words, any rate tuple
which is feasible for the users in V ∗ne can be obtained from a
rate tuple in ΩN by increasing some of the rates.
But since none of the users is decodable for a rate tuple in
ΩN , it is not possible that any non-empty set of users suddently
becomes decodable as some of the transmission rates increase.
Equivalently, for Figure 11, since none of the two users is
decodable when they transmit at a rate pair in ΩN , it is not
possible that one of them becomes decodable by increasing its
rate (such that the rate pair moves to either Ω3 or Ω4 or Ω5).
To see this, using the notation already established in the
previous sections (XS is the set of transmitted sequences of
all users in S , Z is the received sequence, Q is the noise
sequence), for any set S ⊂ V ∗ne we can write
H(XS |Z,XV ∗e ) =
= H(XS |XV ∗e ) +H(Z|XS ,XV ∗e )−H(Z|XV ∗e ) =
= H(XS ) +H(Z|XS ,XV ∗e )−H(Z|XV ∗e ) =
=
∑
j∈S
Rj +H(
∑
i∈V ∗ne\S
Xj +Q)−H(Z|XV ∗e ). (64)
where the last two equalities follow from the independence
of the users. Note that H(
∑
i∈V ∗ne\S
Xj +Q) increases with
any rate Ri, i ∈ V ∗ne \S . But since all rate tuples under con-
sideration are outside the capacity region of the users in V ∗ne,
the received sequence Z displays an asymptotic equipartition
property, as noticed in [19]. Intuitively, this happens because,
as the rate tuple moves outside the capacity region, the volume
of the typical set of received sequences becomes as large as
the volume of the whole channel output space. The immediate
implication is that outside the capacity region H(Z|XV ∗e ) is
a constant function of the rates of the users in V ∗ne.
This concludes our proof that the entropy of the users in
any subset of V ∗ne increases as any of the rates increase. But
since any rate tuple for the users in V ∗ne, situated outside of
the rate region ΩN , can be obtained from a tuple inside ΩN ,
by increasing at least one of the rates, and since none of the
users in ΩN is decodable, this implies that none of the users
in V ∗ne is decodable.
A notable consequence of Lemma 8 above is that, in a
MAC scenario employing Gaussian coding, whenever a user
transmits at a rate which exceeds its channel capacity, the best
strategy for the other users is to treat it as noise.
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